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1. Introduction. The purpose of the study. 
The saving behavior of households presents a subject matter of our study. It is 
defined as 1) postponing of current consumption, 2) accumulation of liquid assets in the 
different forms. The household is the basic unit of the research.  
Economic situation in 1997 – and the first half of 1998 raised hopes that financial 
stabilization, slowing down of the permanent fall in production and inflation, and weak 
downward tendency of incomes' differentiation would produce the basis for the advance 
of the institutional forms of household financial assets. We hoped it would be possible to 
stimulate the conversion of household savings into investments. To a considerable extent, 
this concern about personal saving at that period was caused by the need to estimate the 
investment potential of households and to encourage savings in institutional forms. While 
planing the investigation we were going to analyse household portfolio decisions  and the 
impact of different parameters of households on the compositions of their assets.  
Economic environment had changed after financial and cabinet crisis in August, 
1998. In that situation we had to adapt the main task of our research. Sharp drop in 
exchange rate, jump in consumer prices, depreciation of ruble assets and losses of 
deposits in commercial banks resulted in a break of public trust in all financial 
institutions, mass withdrawal of commercial bank deposits and their subsequent cash 
dollarization. The expert estimations and the data from the post-crisis surveys at the turn 
of 1998 testified to the removing of financial holdings in a number of forms. The crisis, 
on the one hand, has caused the reduction of the institutionalized forms of assets by way 
of removal of money from the deposits and keeping them in cash (dollars and rubles), as 
well as purchasing of consumer goods and stores of food. And on the other – it has 
resulted in losses and depreciating of ruble assets of households along with the rise of 
ruble equivalent of cash dollar's assets. The sharp reduction in personal real incomes has 
led to a steady growth of the consumption rate. In that situation people began to use their 
financial assets for current needs or to transfer them into reserves of food and staple 
commodities. Thus, a reduction of a number of households with any financial assets and 
unification of their forms had happened. It had become obvious that there should be a 
displacement of accents in the survey that was supposed to be carried out in March 1999. 
The analysis of the modification of saving behavior after crisis was considered as its main 
purpose.  
There were a number of hypotheses about the modification of household saving 
behavior: lowering of household real incomes results in decreasing of saving rate, ruble 
depreciation, crisis and stagnation on stock market, uneven distribution of cash dollars 
assets among households before the crisis contribute to both concentration of financial 
assets in a narrow group of households and unification of their forms. On the other hand, 
the same factors have an inverse influence as well – minor income shocks and uncertainty 
about future incomes result in economizing strategies, lowering of consumption patterns 
in the society as a hole and in the reference group (in terms of the relative income theory) 
might encourage savings at least of those who managed to maintain their income. There 
is also an ambiguous effect of crisis on the portfolio behavior: stimulus for searching for 
profitable saving holdings and diversification of households' portfolios which might 
decrease the risk of losses may be counteracted by shifting towards low-risk assets. 
2. Previous studies of household saving behavior 
Economic theory of household saving behavior has not been developed on the eve 
of reforms in the early 90th. On one hand, savings were analysed from the point of view 
of organising and functioning of saving institutions. On the other hand, the 
macroeconomic approach to estimating the amount of compulsory savings predominated. 
It is worth mentioning that savings became voluntary only in the late 50th when the 
mandatory state loans were abolished. However savings remained partly compulsory 
even later as a result of consumer goods' deficits. Households financial assets were 
dramatically depreciated during the period of hyperinflation after the price liberalization 
in the early 90th. Coupled with sharp drop in the real personal incomes it reduced the 
possibilities of households to save, but for the first time agents became really free in their 
decisions about incomes' allocation. Simultaneously the problem of mobilization and 
subsequent investment usage of household assets emerged. 
In the early 90th the stress was laid on the investigations of households saving 
behavior at micro level. A number of surveys were conducted in order to estimate the 
total assets of households and to model their saving behavior.   
One of the first investigations of saving behavior employing all-Russian survey 
data (VCIOM) was conducted in the Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of 
Science, in 1995. There were two main tasks: to elaborate the procedure of estimation of 
the financial potential of households and to work out the policy of converting savings into 
investments.  
The financial potential was defined as an increase of spare money resources. It 
was calculated as money incomes' surplus (total amount of money incomes minus total 
amount of money expenditures). The estimations of saving rate on the VCIOM data basis 
verified the official Goskomstat data, that in November 1994 households saved 25-26% 
of their current incomes. Unusually high level of saving rate for the economy 
experiencing economic recession and high inflation was explained by intense 
precautionary motives.   
Researchers investigate saving abilities of households in different income groups 
and came to the conclusion that ability to save increased with the rise of per capita 
household income.  Households with low level of income had very small amount of spare 
financial resources, savings in the families with average incomes were made in order to 
postpone their consumption at short date, and only the wealthiest families were able to 
invest. But their ability had not been realizing because of the absence of the relevant 
financial tools. According to VCIOM data, families with average incomes preferred to 
accumulate cash rubles and to deposit in Sberbank, while the wealthiest households kept 
accounts with commercial banks. Cash dollars, in spite of their relative depreciation, were 
popular in all income groups of households, while bonds, shares and other securities were 
regarded to be unattractive among all households as well. 
Due to the results of this research, investment potential of households did not 
differ considerably all along Russia. Though Moscow, St. Petersburg and a number of big 
cities stood out against a background of the rest of Russia for the number of financial 
institutions dealing with popular finances, substantial part of financial potential had been 
accumulating among inhabitants of small towns and villages where even ordinary 
Sberbank was not always accessible.    
On the whole, being one of the first economic researches of saving behavior of 
households in reforming Russia this paper revealed all the difficulties in this field: 
ambiguity in the definition of savings both for the researchers and for the ordinary 
people; the puzzle of the unusually high saving rate in the presence of declining living 
standards; essential share of savings in cash (dollars and rubles) which amount was 
difficult to estimate; objective and subjective obstacles in applying economic theories; the 
shortage of empirical data.  
At the same time the Institute of the problems of employment Russian Academy 
of Science and the Ministry of Labor of Russian Federation conducted the sociological  
'Research of the structure of the potential investors in industrial firms and revealing the 
encouraging factors in their investment activity' (1994 - 1995). At the end of 1994 and in 
spring of 1995 two surveys were carried out. Employees at the industrial firms in five 
regions of Russia were questioned within the framework of the research. The structural 
analysis of the forms in which people preferred to keep their financial assets and their 
motivation were the main tasks of this research. All available forms of holdings were 
divided into two groups: investments and non-investments. The later consisted of 
deposits in commercial banks, cash dollars and lending money to natural persons at 
interest. More than 60 % of employees at the industrial enterprises were concerned about 
their savings. Two thirds of them preferred to keep money in Sberbank, one third - to 
convert into cash dollars. The main conclusions: investment components of financial 
assets of employees of industrial firms declined by 15% during the winter of 1994-1995, 
the reduction was more likely for blue-collar workers than for white collar workers. The 
main motives, which had influence on the portfolio composition, were profitability of 
deposits and confidence in the institutions or persons taking money from households. 
During the winter 1994-1995 the importance of confidence raised considerably. The 
attractiveness of Sberbank and confidence in commercial banks raised in respondents' 
opinions, which was more likely for white-collar workers. Concern about shares of 
industrial firms, municipal or regional bonds, investments into financial companies came 
to nothing in contrast to cash dollars and informal crediting. The impact of professional 
and demographic structures at the enterprises on saving (investment) behavior was found. 
The most well-educated blue-collar and white-collar workers were likely to accumulate 
cash dollars, to lend money and to invest into shares of profitable enterprises. Uneducated 
workers and clerks were interested in the shares of enterprises where they worked. 
Deposits in commercial banks seemed to be attractive for the polar groups of employees: 
black-coated workers and unskilled workers. As a whole this research showed the  
possibilities of structural descriptive analysis of individual saving behavior.  
The Institute of social and economic problems of the population RAS conducted 
the most large-scale research in the field of household saving behavior in October 1996 
which was financed by the Central Bank of Russian Federation. Two types of data were 
used to study household saving behavior: all Russian cross-sectional standardized survey 
(almost 8000 respondents) data and 70 interviews with the representatives of the 
wealthiest group of families in four regions of Russia. Researchers turned their attention 
to the puzzle how to explain that in the presence of low incomes, growth of wage, 
pension and other social security benefits arrears households managed to save one fifth of 
their money incomes (as macro statistics reported).  The question of primary concern was 
to estimate the total amount of household savings and financial assets and to shed light 
upon the main portfolio strategies. The authors came to the conclusion about great 
polarization of material well-being of households and concentration of two thirds of 
financial assets in 5% of families, that could explain the paradox of combination of low 
average incomes with high average saving rate.  
Financial assets consisted of deposits in banks, securities and cash, rubles and 
dollars. Cash dollars accumulated by small entrepreneurs of 'shuttle trade' for purchases 
abroad were excluded. The empirical findings indicated that 21% of all households had 
money excess over current expenses and 59% of all households had financial assets. The 
typology of savers was constructed using motives and aims of saving. A number of 
recommendations were elaborated to convert savings into investments.  
In 1997-98 Russian Center of Privatization and the Institute of Europe RAS 
realized the project 'Analysis and working out of the guidelines of stimulating of 
household savings and encouraging of their converting into investments in the context of 
government policy aimed at economic growth'. This research was based on the data of the 
fifth (December 1994), sixth (October 1995) and seventh (October 1996) waves of the 
Russian Longitude Monitoring Survey (Panel data) to discover the structure of financial 
activity of  households and to analyze its stability over two years. Because in the database 
RLMS there were no information about saving deposits of households, amount and 
structure of their financial assets, saving motives, research had to be restricted within the 
analysis of saving behavior during the previous 30 days. The notions of positive (saving) 
and negative (dissaving) financial behavior were imposed.  
Researchers came to the conclusion that during the period of two years the 
positive financial behavior had been reduced and the activity within negative type had 
been increased. When the households were segregated into groups of active and passive 
agents, and among the active part savers, dissavers and combinators were distinguished,  
the households which stuck to the same type of financial behavior during all the period of 
investigation were not numerous. And the majority of them were in the group of 
financially passive households. As a whole financial activity had been reducing. The 
researches also estimated correlation between the trends of per capita income in 
households and changes in financial behavior, which turned out to be significant.  
3. Financial crisis in August 1998 and its influencing on the economy. 
One year between two our surveys (February-March 1998, March 1999) because 
of the August crisis 1998 has proved to be turning in many respects, and first of all in the 
field of household incomes, consumption and savings.  
According to the official statistic macro data real household incomes in the first 
quarter of 1999 were came to 73 % of their level a year before, and real wage - only  to 
58.5 %. During the first quarter the average nominal monthly wage exceeded the level of 
living standard only by 47.7% (one year before - more than two times), that argued in 
favor of the extension of poverty.  
The structure of allocation of money incomes had been considerably modified. 
According to the data of the official statistics household expenses steadily exceeded 80 % 
of the total money incomes of households. The decreasing of the purchasing power of 
personal incomes resulted in forced rise of the expenses for food at the expense of 
nonfoods and services. These tendencies characterized the behavior of the majority of 
households, and it became especially evident in the low-income groups.  
The lowering of the purchasing power of household money incomes resulted in 
the reduction of the retail trade turnover (by 15.8% in one year). According to the official 
data the consumer expenses were reduced by 20 %. However if we take into account the 
shift towards cheaper domestic products and the fact that prices for services have been 
growing much slowly comparing with consumer lines, real consumption probably had not 
changed that much. According to the estimations of experts of the Bureau of Economical 
Analysis, the real consumption structure in spring of 1999 did not generally differ from 
that one had been formed in 1995: there was a shift from expensive imports to cheaper 
domestic products and services which had relatively fallen in price. 
Some improving of economic activities during the first quarter of 1999 did not 
result in evident changes on the labour market where situation remained tight. At the end 
of March 1999 the total number of the unemployed (using the methodology of ILO) 
amounted to 10 million people, 13,6 % from the active population, against 8.3 million 
people (or 11,4 %) at the end of March 1998.  It is 18,7 % increase for one year. 
Thus there were several factors of the maintaining consumption at the similar to 
pre-crisis level.  
First, permanent settlements of the wage, pension, and other arrears compensated 
the decline of real wages and incomes of the population.  
Secondly, there was a considerable decrease in saving rates. If during a half of a 
year before the crisis average saving rate according to official data was equal to 18,5%, 
eight months after August 1998, including August - only 8%. For many families it meant 
dissaving. The alternate estimation of the share of savings in household incomes (subject 
to the net increase of cash dollars on hand) in the post-crisis period was close to zero. 
Thirdly, the decreasing of purchasing power of household assets in rubles was 
partly compensated by the rising of the ruble valuation of household assets in dollars. 
However, only those households which kept their financial assets in cash dollars on the 
eve of crisis were able to use this advantage. As a result, resources were redistributed in 
favor of pre-crisis cash dollars' holders. 
Finally, the informal employment in the market and within the household sectors 
created a stream of unregistered money and in-kind incomes.   
Let's consider the macroeconomic tendencies during the period of one year  
March 1998 - March 1999 and the influence of the crisis on economic activity.  
The latter half of 1997 was characterized by high consumer activity of the 
population before announced denomination on January 1, 1998. Households were 
engaged in the process of active buying of durables, real estate objets, cash dollars trying 
to minimize cash rubles, increases of deposits in banks and securities. The favorable 
conditions for the rise in institutional forms of savings had been developed after 
denomination which had happened to be lossless for all households, in despite of started 
slowly reduction in real household incomes. The confidence of the population in the 
institution and tools of financial market had increased. The bankers' ruble deposit rate 
during the first half of the year 1998 steadily exceeded dynamics of both the exchange 
rate and the consumer price index. In the middle of 1998 the retail trade turnover and 
purchasing of cash dollars had declined, and increase of depositing in banks and 
securities as well as the rise of ruble cash had happened.  
However in the middle of 1998 these positive tendencies began to exhaust, on one 
hand, because of declining trends of the household real incomes and increasing of wage, 
pension and other arrears. On the other hand, in the first half of 1998 the current account 
balance and balance of trade were negative and equaled, respectively, -6,0 and -0,3 bln. 
dollars.  It was the result of unfavorable for Russia world market opportunities and the 
increase in payments of interest charges to foreign debtors. Liquid currency reserves were 
also reduced. Expectations of the imminent devaluation of ruble were formed during the 
summer of 1998 in financial markets. 
The crisis in August, 1998 has changed the situation rather sharply. On the 1st of 
September, 1998 an official rate of US dollar to Russian ruble was equal to 9,3 
rub./dollars, having increased since August, 15 (6,2900 руб./dollars) almost 1,5 times. At 
the middle of March 1999 the exchange rate had grown since August 1998  3,5 times.  
The index of consumer prices since August 1998 till March 1999 came to 179,2 
%. In the first quarter of 1999 the speed of inflation was slackened. So, the index of 
consumer prices in January, 1999 came to 108,4 %, in February - 104,1 %, in March - 
102,8 %. The annual growth of consumer prices in 1999 appeared to be much less than it 
was forecasted in the beginning of the year. In conjunction with stability of exchange rate 
it had reduced in some valuation of ruble. 
The withdrawing money from bank accounts which started in June, 1998 after 
August 17 had become stronger. According to the data of Central Bank in December 
1998 the accumulated sum of deposits had decreased by 13 %, the majority of losses fell 
on commercial banks (40 % decrease). In Sberbank the reduction of deposits was 
significantly smaller. In the early 1999 the lowering of households deposits in banks had 
been stopped.  The total bank balances grew to increase, but only in Sberbank, the 
withdrawing money from bank accounts in commercial banks continued. At the end of 
May, 1999 the total sum of money on individual deposits in these banks was no more 
than 65 % from the pre-crisis level. In March, 1999 for the first time from the beginning 
of the year there was an increase in net cash dollars balance: households bought more 
cash dollars than sold. In comparison with previous month's data it was increased in 2,7 
times.  
The crisis had an effect on the whole banking system.  
Table 1.The characteristics of the banking system 
 On the 1st of August, 
1998 
On the 1st of April, 
1999 
The number of acting banks 1573 1433 
The number of bank's affiliates 4807 4275 
           including affiliates of Sberbank 1901 1801 
Total assets, bln.rub. 753,8 1248,9 
 
The bank crisis had reduced in the downswing of banking capital. According to 
some estimations, the amount of banks' net worth during August – October 1998 was 
reduced more than three times: from 67 bln. rub. down to 20 bln. rub.  
The greatest damage was caused by crisis to the largest Moscow banks because of 
substantial activity on “frozen” GKO-OFZ market, foreign exchange market and great 
share of individual deposits in the composition of their debt capital. Regional banks 
experienced similar, but 'benign' problems. Financial crisis had reduced in lowering of 
banking capital and rise of the liquidity deficit.  
The crisis resulted in the increase of the number of financially unstable banks. The 
share of them in the total number of banks had increased from 36 % (1.08.98) up to 
42,5% (1.09.98); in the total amount of assets – from  12 % (1.08.98) up to 43,7 % 
(1.09.98).   
In the early 1999 Russian financial markets stabilized, the lowering of the interest 
rates of all financial trading had happened. Profitability of governmental securities 
declined from 60- 85 % in July - August 1998 till 16-20 of % in July - August 1999, the 
rates of ruble interbank crediting had also declined: from 45-60 of % down to 20 - 12 %. 
It is necessary to mark the positive consequences of the crisis in the banking 
sphere. The lowering of the share of individual deposits, which will not be possible to 
change even if the confidence in banking system would be restored, stimulated the 
banking system to credit enterprises, because the assets of enterprises were used by banks 
as a security for loans. And the ruble deposits of enterprises began to be restored rather 
fast.  
That fact that the banking system seemed to be more productive oriented was one 
of the consequences of depreciating of the state bonds and revaluation of the currency 
credits. The amount of crediting of the economy (basically because of the increase of the 
ruble estimation of its currency part, and not because of real activity in this field) was 
increased during 1998 from 9.4% up to 11% of GDP. However productive orientation of 
banking credit policy increases the credit risk. Taking into account the actual state of the 
real sector profitable allocation of financial resources of banks within this sector is still 
limited.  
The crisis transformed the composition of banking elite and reallocated the 
spheres of influence inside it. The differentiation of the owned capitals and profits of 
large banks had been increased, as well as the role of Sberbank and influence of regional 
authorities. 
At present the Russian banking system has no other source of its developing but 
the real sector of the economy, which financial position seemed to improve. The 
modification of economic environment after August crisis was happening in the presence 
of the increase of the demand for domestics in the home market. Reducing of the 
inventory materials funds and stocks of finished industrial products accompanied this 
process. Displacing barter with money payments interplant was the evidence of the 
improving of the financial state of the industrial firms.   
According to the official statistics, in 1999 the industrial production leaded all the 
economy. In fuel and energy branches the situation had been improved as a result of the 
rise in oil world prices. The support to the industry (in tractor and agricultural 
engineering) was rendered by the state. The shift of the demand of the population to the  
domestics also had positive influence on dynamics of consumer goods industries. 
After the crisis there were positive changes in the balance of payments: if in the 
first half of 1998 the current transactions in the balance of payments of Russia were 
negative —  minus 5,6 bln. doll., one year later it became positive - almost 13 bln.doll.  
The foreign trade turnover in the first half of 1999 was  52 bln.doll. (the reduction by 28 
%). The cost of export had declined by 13 %, import - by 44 %.  
Thus, if to characterize the main consequences of the crisis for the economy as a 
whole at the end of 1998 - first quarter 1999, it is necessary to mark that in spite of the 
fact that the devaluation had happened in the very morbid and trying form, it had rather 
positive influence. The improving of the balance of payments, stabilization of ruble, 
improving in banking sphere and the recovery of industry in the aggregate created the 
necessary prerequisites for economic growth, increasing of households' incomes and 
savings. 
4. The model specification. 
In economic theory, the analysis of saving behavior, and especially its dynamic, is 
based on the saving function modeling. We consider the pattern of savings in 
contemporary Russia seems to be consistent with Friedman's Permanent income 
hypothesis with the assumption that there is uncertainty about future incomes. The PIH 
model assumes that consumption (saving) of households is determined by its permanent 
income. Friedman assumes that the utility function of household is symmetrical and 
homogeneous in all time periods. Permanent income is the discounted expected flow of 
income from human and non-human wealth. In that case the households in long-term 
period consume the permanent part of their permanent income, keeping their wealth 
invariable. In short-run perspective people smooth out fluctuations in income by saving in 
the periods of unusually high incomes and dissaving when they are low. The life-cycle 
hypothesis in our opinion is less applicable, because in the presence of very low level of 
current money incomes households are not able to accumulate resources for the 
retirement, all the more in the absence of working financial institutions of that kind. 
Well-known Friedman's hypothesis assumes that people base consumption on 
what they consider as 'normal' income, which they expect to earn over considerable 
period of time. This 'normal' income will normally differ from their current, measured 
income. The difference between these two incomes  is transitory income. So in the 
simplest model of PIH we have 
C = k Yp,         k = F (i, w, x), 
where C – consumption, Yp – household permanent income in the period t, i – 
discount rate, w – proportion of nonhuman wealth to other types of wealth, x – other 
parameters (age, tastes and the like). Friedman made time-series test of his hypothesis 
based on the annual data for the period 1905-1951, excluding war years. He constructed 
the variable of permanent income by a weighted average of past values of disposable 
income, assuming that the weights  assigned to the disposable income are smaller for 
more distant incomes than recent incomes. 
 Unfortunately, we do not have the time-series panel data about incomes and 
consumption of households, so we are not able to construct the similar independent 
variable, or to include incomes or consumption in the previous periods to obtain  
unbiased regression estimations. We do not have data about gross value of liquid wealth 
of households (summer house, car), so we will use dummy variables for estimation of 
households' wealth. 
 Estimating equation looks like: 
Ci = a0 + a1 Yi + a2 Ai +Σ aj Wij + Σ ak Xik + εi 
where for  i household:  Ci - consumption, а Yi – annual income, Ai – sum of 
assets (deposits and cash) in the beginning of the period, Wij – other liquid wealth 
variables, Xik – a set of individual and household characteristics (age, a number of 
children and the like), εi - random error. 
For the analysis of the portfolio behavior we use the model with binary dependent 
variable (logit). We test the effect of some household’s characteristics (income, wealth, 
family structure) on the presence/absence of any financial assets. Then we use the same 
set of variable to test their effect on the each form of assets. The general model takes the 
form: 
Aij = ΣkakiHHkj + ΣmbmiFAMmj + ΣlcliINCOMEj + ΣndniWEALTHnj + 
ΣpfpiEXPENpj + eij 
Where Aij is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household j have the asset i and 
otherwise equal to zero; HHkj is the set of k personal characteristics of household’s head 
as gender, education, marital status, etc., FAMmj is the set of m characteristics of the 
household as number of member, children, etc., INCOMEj is the household’s income per 
capita, WEALTHnj is the set of n characteristics of the household’s wealth, as owned 
apartment, car, etc., EXPENpj is the set of p characteristics of the household’s 
consumption, expenditure and finance, as borrowing, buying, etc.,  eij is a random error. 
5. The data sources of the research: 1998, 1999 samples. 
Economic family, that is people living together and sharing joint budget of 
incomes and expenditures, is the object of our research. The research is focused on the 
latter half of the 90s. The using of the data from the other surveys (VCIOM, RLMS) for 
the studying of portfolio and saving behavior is limited because of the lack of information 
(unavailability of a number of variables and the insufficient questioning period). That is 
why our research is founded on the data set of two our own surveys carried out in four 
Russian towns which are representing different types of regions in the European part of 
Russia. The 1998 survey was financed by Ford foundation within the framework of the 
research of survival strategies of Russian households in February - March 1998 in 
Moscow, Nizhni Novgorod and Ivanovo. The same three cities (plus Syktyvkar, Republic 
of Komi) were surveyed in March 1999. This survey was designed within the framework 
of present research. 250 families were surveyed in each city. The sampling and 
interviewing was conducted by the Center of sociological researches at Moscow State 
University. The routing sample was designed as a random selection of 10-20 routes 
(points, streets) uniformly located on a spiral from the center of a city. A house was 
randomly selected in each point (taking into account the number of storeys in it), and in a 
house each n-numbered apartment was picked up. 
We want to emphasise that we do not have a panel, there are two different 
samples. 
Urban population has been picked out for our research because of its main saving 
potential, as well as because of the tight project budget and survey's limits. There was no 
aim to realize all-Russian representative sampling, but to present different types of 
regions of the European part of Russia and to have comparability with our previous data 
(the survey in 1998), that is to have basis for estimating of the process in dynamic. 
There is no doubt that Moscow represents unique for Russia region, with the 
highest per capita income and income differentiation, the most advanced financial 
infrastructure and the greatest saving activity of the population. Nizhniy Novgorod 
represents not metropolitan financial center with close to average level of social and 
economic parameters. The republic of Komi is a resource-rich region with rather stable 
social and economic position, significant share of raw branches and high per capita 
income, and Ivanovo is an example of depressed regions with the lowest income and 
great share of poor households.  
Survey data 1998. In February-March 1998 the survey was carried out in three 
cities: Moscow, Ivanovo and Nizhni Novgorod. About 750 families (approximately on 
250 in each city) were questioned on random route sampling in total. The data about 
more than 2000 persons were obtained taking into account all members of households. 
Though a variety of different types of families was represented, our sample was slightly 
biased comparing with Goskomstat data. The proportion of able-boded and highly 
educated persons was higher in all cities. In Moscow we had the lower share of the 
households with children and extended families, and in Nizshni Novgorod – the higher 
one.  Because the type of the family correlated with the level of incomes and 
expenditures, we considered incomes in Moscow and Ivanovo to be overestimated and in 
Nizshni Novgorod – to be underestimated. It can also affect on the comparison with 
1998.  
The questionnaire in 1998 is smaller than in the survey 1999, so not all the 
comparisons are possible. 
Survey data 1999. The survey was carried out in March 1999 and it was 
conducted in four cities: Moscow, Ivanovo, Nizhni Novgorod and Syktyvkar. More than 
1060 families (approximately on 250 in each city) were questioned on random route 
sampling in total. The data about more than 2846 persons were obtained taking into 
account all members of households. We can say that the main demographic 
characteristics of the sample were closer to those of general population than in the survey 
in 1998. The structure of families practically did not deviate from the real one taking into 
account the number of people in the family, but the proportion of families with 3 children 
were overstated in Moscow, and understated in Ivanovo and Nizhni Novgorod. It can 
caused the underestimation of income in Moscow, and also affect on the comparison with 
1998, when we had the reverse bias. As well as in 1998 the proportion of able-bodied and 
higher-educated citizens was overstated. 
The average values of all main socio-demographic variables of the surveys 1998, 
1999 are represented in Appendix 1,2. 
6. The empirical results: incomes, consumption, savings, wealth, assets of 
households. 
Incomes and expenditures of households. According to our data, the monthly 
average per capita income for in January 1999 - March 1999 in Moscow was 1362 rub. 
(in the year 1998 in terms of 1999 with regional deflator  - 2535 rub.), in Ivanovo - 581 
(1300 rub. in the year 1998), in Nizhni Novgorod - 690 (1250 rub. in the year 1998), in 
Syktyvkarе - 950 rub1. If to compare these outcomes to those in the year 1998 we can say 
that real incomes in all three regions have been reduced approximately more than 2 times, 
and there was a fall even in nominal terms in Ivanovo.  
According to data of State Committee of Statistics per capita nominal money 
incomes in March 1999 were equal to 4965,1 rub. in Moscow, 721,7 rub. - in Ivanovo 
region, 862,4 rub. - in Nizhniy Novgorod region, 1707,3 rub.- in republic of Komi, cost 
of living:  1166 rub. – in Moscow, 746 rub. – in Ivanovo, 707 rub. in  Nizhni Novgorod, 
868 rub. – in Komi. It is obvious that our data differ from the official statistics, though in 
Ivanovo and Nizhni Novgorod this lack of correspondence does not exceed the usual 
discrepancy between the data of surveys and official statistics (about 20 %). The 
differences for Syktyvkar and Moscow are bigger, that can be explained by usual for such 
surveys lack of very wealthy households (the wealth differentiation in these regions is 
higher), refusals to give answers about income and underestimating of income by 
respondents. In Moscow it might be a result of overstating of households with 3 children 
and low income, and the higher proportion of those who had refused to give any 
information about their income.  
A typology of material well being of families had been applied in analyzing of the 
variation in their saving behaviour. We divided the sample into 4 conditional groups 
using the criterion of income – to – cost of living ratio in every region. In 1998, the level 
of incomes equal to one regional minimum of subsistence (RMS) was used to define a 
                                                           
1 1 dollar in March 1999 was equal to 24,18 rubles. 
poverty line, the level of incomes of needy families for was defined from 1 up to 2 RMS, 
independent families with medium incomes - from 2 up to 4 RMS, rich households - 
more than 4 RMS. In 1999, we have to adjust the poverty line 2 times downwards 
because of a profound change in income and minimum of subsistence parity in Russia 
(see The table 2). 
Table 2. Proportion of the families with a ratio of the per capita income to 
the regional minimum of subsistence in 1998 and 1999 samplings 
 
   Moscow
  
Ivanovo N.Novgorod Syktyvkar Total 
March 1998       
Less than 1 RMS 24,6% 17,9% 29,3%  24,2% 
1-2 RMS 44,5% 47,9% 46,2%  46,2% 
2-4 RMS 21,2% 26,1% 18,4%  21,7% 







Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%  100,0% 
RMS, rub. 552 296 312   







Per capita income/ RMS 5,21 1,76 1,97   
March 1999       
Less than 1 RMS 71,5% 82,9% 76,7% 62,9% 73,8% 
1-2 RMS 16,7% 13,5% 18,9% 25,3% 18,5% 
2-4 RMS 8,1% 2,4% 2,4% 10,0% 5,6% 







Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0
% 
RMS, rub. 1166 746 707 868  







Per capita income/ RMS 4,25 0,97 1,22 1,97  
 
Changing the criteria means that, for example, the needy families in 1998 had per 
capita income within the limits of 1 to 2 RMS, and in 1999 - within 0,5 to 1 RMS. As a 
result of this change we have got the similar to 1998 structure of groups of families. 
Nevertheless, we see the changes in regions: the growth of income differentiation in 
Moscow and "disappearance" of the supplied stratums in Ivanovo and Nizhni Novgorod. 
An analysis of demographic structure of these groups of families gave us the main 
“risk factors” which raises likelihood of a family to be poor or needy: 
• Families with a plenty of children and dependents and families with several 
generations. 
• Not full families, especially mother lone families. 
• Families of pensioners or unemployed. 
• Families of people without higher education and at an advanced age.  
The structure of sources of incomes has not changed a lot during the last year, but 
we see changes within the groups. Though both in 1998, and in 1999 the proportion of 
social transfers received by the families declines along with the growth of income 
(approximately from 40% up to 5 %) and the share of wages and incomes from 
entrepreneurial activities and self-employment grows, but the proportion of the latter 
sources has been essentially reduced. The proportion of income from entrepreneurial 
activities in the group of the rich households reduced from 18% down to 9% and for self 
employment income  - from 16% down to 6% at expense of wage share rising. In other 
groups the proportion of those incomes (not more than 3-4 %) remained invariable. 
Though it may be partly the result of changes in the structure of sampling.  






'The poor' 24,6 17,9 29,3  24,2 
'The needy' 44,5 47,9 46,2  46,2 
'The independent' 21,2 26,1 18,4  21,7 
'The rich' 9,7 8,1 6,0  7,9 1
99
8 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0  100,0 
'The poor' 32,6 28,3 27,3 24,9 28,2 
'The needy' 38,9 54,6 49,4 38,0 45,6 
'The independent' 16,7 13,5 18,9 25,3 18,5 
'The rich' 11,8 3,6 4,4 11,8 7,7 1
99
9 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
 
The structure of expenditures has not change much (incomes +/– savings) both on 
average and within the groups. The structure of expenditures in poor and rich families 
differs essentially. Purchases of food give more than three quarters of total expenditures 
in the poor families, including all other current expenses makes 93 %; rich households 
spend for purchases of the durables 7-8 % of their income, for real estate – 8-10 %, for 
other heavy purchases – 12-13%.  
The most essential modification has happened in the particular sphere of 
household savings. In 1998, there were more households that had been saving than 
dissaving during the previous year in all income groups. For example, more than a half of 
rich families had increased their financial assets and only 6% of them – decreased, the 
amount of money saved was 12 times greater than the shortfall of savings.  In 1999 there 
was the reverse tendency.  
Table 4. The proportion of households had been saving or dissaving 
during the year (balance of income and expenditures) within the income 
groups. 




The ratio of the total amount of money 
saved to the amount of money dissaved 
during the year 
'The poor' 13,7 8,0 7,9 
'The needy' 19,0 8,0 2,0 
'The 
independent' 
28,8 12,8 2,0 




Total 23,3 7,1 4,1 
'The poor' 7,8 22,4 0,4 
'The needy' 18,0 34,8 0,2 
'The 
independent' 
27,3 40,4 0,4 




Total 18,7 35,2 0,3 
 
Situation in the beginning of 1998 was really favourable to hope for positive 
dynamics in saving behavior. According to the data of our surveys, during 1997 7,4 % of 
families regularly put aside money and 21,2 % of them did it occasionally, from the 
beginning of 1998 up to August crisis - 14,4 and 33,9 % accordingly. Crisis in August has 






Consumption function estimation. According to our data, in the early year 1999 
in comparison with a year before households started to smooth out their consumption by 
dissaving in the presence of the negative income shock. This behavior is consistent with 
the main prediction of the Permanent Income Hypothesis for the short-time period about 
the smoothing of the consumption function. 
Table 5. The proportion of households with positive, negative and zero 
savings during the preceding year (% in columns). 
Savings Survey 1998 Survey 1999 Total 
Consumption exceeds income (negative 
savings) 















1 0 0 %
 in  1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8  u p  to  c r is is 1 9 9 8  a fte r  c ris is
    
     d o  n o t s a v e
     s a v e  o c c a s io n a lly
    
s a v e  re g u la rly
Consumption exceeds income 
(zero savings) 
69,6% 46,1% 55,9% 
Income exceeds consumption (positive 
savings) 
23,3% 18,7% 20,6% 
As it could be seen from the Table 5, almost 70% in 1998 and 50% in 1999 of 
households had been living within their means. Reports about dissaving increased from 
7,1% of households in 1998 up to 35,2% - in 1999. Only 18,7% of families had managed 
to save in 1999 in contrast to 23,3% - in 1998. 

























The Figure 2 shows that consumption exceeded incomes for a considerable 
proportion of households in the year 1999 in contrast to the year 1998. Functional 
dependence is close to the liner one in logarithmic scale at the angle of near to 45%. 
For the quantitative estimation of the dependence of households' consumption 
from incomes and its shifting after the crisis we estimated econometric model (the 
description was given in the section 4). 
The main variables of the model (the average values are presented in Appendix 3). 
Financial variables of incomes and consumption: 
• Total sum of family income (log) – the sum of all incomes of all family 
members had been obtained from all income sources during the preceding year 
in rubles and dollars, dollars were evaluated in rubles at the average rate. For 
the year 1998 all the financial variables (incomes, consumption, savings) were 
recalculated subject to regional deflators. 
• The total sums of financial assets of a family at the first of the preceding year 
(log) – the sum of household's money assets in deposits (Sberbank, 
commercial banks) and in cash (rubles and dollars). Dollars were evaluated in 
rubles at the official rate in March 1999.  
• Annual consumption of a family (log) was calculated as a difference between 
total sum of annual incomes and total annual savings. Total annual savings 
were calculated as a difference between the total sum of assets at the first and 
at the end of the preceding year. 
Wealth variables: 
• Living space of the apartments per person 
• If a summer house is available  
• If a garden plot is available 
• If a car is available 
Socio-demographic variables: 
• The number of members in a family  sharing the common budget 
• The number of children under 16 years 
• The number of employed members in a family 
• The gender of the bread-winner of a family (a person whose income 
constitutes the biggest proportion in the total family income) 
• The age of the bread-winner /10, age/10 squared 
• If the bread-winner has high education. 
Consumption function estimation defines the contribution of every factor to the 
increase of family consumption; the empirical results of the regression analysis are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 6. Consumption function estimation. Dependent variable - logarithm of 
households' annual consumption. 
 Surveys 
1998,1999 
Survey 1998  Survey 1999  












logarithm of household's financial assets 

































The number of members in a family  























The gender of the bread-winner of a 



























Moscow (yes=1) -,006 -,009 ,040 
(-,341) (-,567) (1,328) 










Year of 1998 (yes=1) -,024 
(-1,401) 
- - 
F 1114,589 *** 1393,68 *** 445,28 *** 
R2adj 0,924 0,969 0,891 
The number of families 1530 659 856 
*** - statistically significant at the 0,001 level, ** - statistically significant at the 
0,05 level, * - statistically significant at the 0,1 level. 
 
According to estimation, we see that the consumption function has been changed. 
The changes are more vivid when the estimations were made for each year separately, 
because the curve has become steeper, but has not been shifted in parallel.  
Figure 2 gives a scatter plot of annual households' consumption and income where 
we see that the curve became steeper (because of consumption on balance). Empirical 
estimation of the consumption function without including of the variable of total sum of 
assets at the first of the year confirms the visual observations. Including this variable into 
equation shows that in the year 1998 income was practically the only determinant of 
consumption, coefficient was close to 1. The contribution of the amount of assets was not 
big, and the rest of factors (socio-demographic) had no influence on consumption. At the 
same time in the year 1999 the impact of income on consumption had reduced (the 
coefficient and the slope of the curve declined). The influence of accumulated assets on 
consumption significantly increased, they substituted the reduced income in order to keep 
household consumption as invariable as possible, and in addition the family 
characteristics started to be influential. 
It means that the reduced post-crisis level of incomes was not considered to be 
'normal', income losses were seen as negative transitory income which entailed the 
process of dissaving. 
The main types of assets and wealth of households. In the theory, the 
propensity to save is closely connected to accumulated assets, or wealth of the family, 
however this relationship is ambiguous. As a rule, the material well being usually is 
related to the level of income. It is possible to assume, that rich families having a high 
level of income, large apartments, cars, country-houses etc. are more likely to put spare 
cash in financial forms of savings; on the other hand, the desire to improve living 
conditions might result in accumulation of sizeable assets and vice versa in the case of 
recent purchase of an apartment the household might even tick. At the same time, even 
bad housing conditions can not stimulate poor families to save, as they do not have 
possibility to accumulate for that improving.  
In the group of rich families (in 1999) owning of the dwellings was more popular 
– only 25% of rich families lived in non-privatized apartments, whereas in the other 
groups - about a half. Though the major part of apartments was passed to households via 
free of charge privatization (50 %). The sizable portion of the rich families (6,8 %) rented 
their apartments. Therewith 17,5 % of independent and rich families (in contrast to 8,5 % 
of the needy) had the second dwelling. 
Approximately a quarter of families in each group had a plot, from 23% (among 
'the poor') up to 40% (among 'the independent') had a country house. During 1993-1999 
less than 7% of families had purchased a flat, less than 8 % - summerhouse, 12,4 % - a 
car, the majority of these kinds of purchases (from 2/3 to ¾) had been done before 1998. 
The differences among the groups were not very big in the case of housing conditions, 
they are much bigger if cars had been taken into account. Only 13,6% poor families had a 
car, and 0,5 % had bought it during last year, 4,5 % did it in 1992-96 years, and the other 
had bought their cars even earlier. In contrast to them 52,1 % of the rich families had a 
car, and 42,4 % had bought it after 1992. As to durables, needy and rich families differed 
very little in possession of a standard set of household appliances (TV set, refrigerator, 
washing machine) and essentially in possession and buying videotape recorders, 
microwaves, dishwashers, computers. The crisis resulted in the reduction of buying of 
furniture, household appliances, and expenses for redecorating flats and construction. The 
proportion of families, which were engaged in those kinds of activities, had reduced half 
to the level at the beginning of the year 1998. 
In the year 1998, approximately each fifth family (19,6%) had an insurance policy 
(among the rich - 34,5 %, and two thirds of them – several policies of different kind). In 
1999, 17% of families had an insurance policy (among the rich – 24,7%). In 1999, rich 
households had property insurance policies 2,5 times more often than poor (4 times - in 
1998), and additional medical insurance – 6 times (11 times – in 1998). For poor families 
there was a tendency to insure their lives (the fact that has appeared only in 1999) and 
against accidents.  
Relatively considerable amount of families had shares and securities (15,4 % in 
1998, 16,9%  - in 1999), but only half of families considered that those securities could 
be sold, and a little less - could estimate their price. The overwhelming majority of 
securities' holders had the shares of the enterprises where they worked, especially among 
the needy families (69, 4% (81 % - in 1998) among poor households and 50% (38,5 % - 
in 1998) among rich families). Rich families had shares of various financial companies 
and funds - 30% among all holders of securities. By the share holders' estimations, the 
shares of the enterprises were most liquid (about 60 % of their owners considered that 
they were able to sell them), but this assurance might be unrealistic, as the significant part 
of such families, especially needy, had no experience of operations on a capital market. It 
is also confirmed by significant share of those who did not know, whether their assets 
were liquid (mostly among the poor and the needy). The highest share of those who 
supposed that their securities could be sold (though with some difficulties) was among 
the rich families (70%). 
In March 1999, 42,5 % of families had financial assets in institutional form 
(except for the securities of different kind and debts). Ruble deposits in Sberbank, cash 
rubles and cash dollars were the most popular forms of all financial assets. Such forms as 
ruble deposits in commercial banks, dollar deposits in Sberbank and in commercial banks 
were used considerably less often. It is noteworthy that there was the difference in 
estimations of the situation in March 1998 in two surveys, especially about deposits in 
Sberbank and cash currency. They might be explained in different ways: statistically 
(sampling effect) and psychologically (retrospective effect).  




Right now Before the 
crisis in 
August 
A year ago Right now 
 
March 99 August 98 March 98 March 98 
1 Cash rubles 40,9 58,4 60,3 41,9 
2 Cash dollars 22,4 24,7 24,0 18,9 
3 Ruble deposits in Sberbank 44,6 46,0 45,3 72,7 
4 Dollar deposits in Sberbank 1,8 1,8 1,2 4,3 
5 Ruble deposits in commercial 
bank 
4,7 7,0 7,1 5,9 
6 Dollar deposits in commercial 
bank 
1,9 2,2 2,1 1,6 
7 Securities of different kind 20,9 20,6 20,7 _ 
8 Rubles lent  26,9 12,9 11,7 _ 
9 Dollars lent  7,0 3,5 2,2 _ 
 No assets from the list 1-6 57,5 48,9 45,7 56,3 
 
According to the data the total amount of assets has been reduced: cash rubles – 
three times less, cash dollars – two times less, deposits in Sberbank – one and a half times 
less. We see evident dissaving activity. 
Table 8. The total sum of money in different types of assets, survey data 1999  
Survey 1999  
 
Right now Before the 
crisis in 
August 
A year ago 
 
March 99 August 98 March 98 
1 Rubles in cash 571 890 1 079 380 1 577 552 
2 Dollars in cash 80 303 185 427 198 117 
3 Ruble deposits in Sberbank 648 324 825 611 946 671 
4 Dollar deposits in Sberbank  7 050 17 640 6 150 
5 Ruble deposits in comm. banks 94 254 142 050 140 102 
6 Dollar deposits in comm. banks 7 900 15 500 14 000 
7 Securities of different kind 157 037 274 372 361 607 
8 Rubles lent 326 425 201 150 108 460 
9 Dollars lent 36 435 27 200 29 800 
 The number of families =950    
 
As far as shares in financial funds and financial credit instruments are concerned, 
people frequently were not able to give pecuniary estimation to these assets. They even 
did not know whether they could get back any sum of money. The same situation was for 
the sums of money that had been landed by a family to someone else. As a result, people 
did not consider these assets as their real financial assets. Landing money to physical 
bodies had no interest motives, rather the act of good will and help. So sometimes we will 
exclude these assets when analyzing household portfolio behavior.  
The dynamics of assets composition of the families in different income 
groups. The diversification of the household portfolio of financial assets is not a very 
popular strategy for households in Russia: 42,5 % of households which had any asset, 
including 26,2 % - who invested into one type of asset, 12,6 % - in two, 3,4 % - in three, 
0,3 % - in four (out of possible 6 kinds). And the diversity of the forms of assets could be 
found only in the group of rich families that mostly lived in Moscow. The asset 
composition was changing along with increasing of household's income – the cash rubles 
and dollars and deposits in commercial banks were rising and deposits in Sberbank were 
reducing. 
 
Table 9. The proportion of households in each income group with the 
































































































































































































































































































































The poor Te needy The independent The rich
    





     Cash dollars       Dollar deposits in Sberbank      Ruble deposits in Com. bank
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Rubles in cash 26,0 39,2 53,1 50,0 40,9 
Dollars in cash 13,0 13,8 30,1 58,3 22,4 
Ruble deposits in Sberbank 39,0 49,6 43,4 36,7 44,6 
Dollar deposits in Sberbank  1,0 1,7 ,9 5,0 1,8 
Ruble deposits in comm. banks 2,0 3,3 6,2 11,7 4,7 
Dollar deposits in comm. banks ,0 2,1 ,9 6,7 1,9 
Securities of different kind 20,0 23,8 20,4 11,7 20,9 
Rubles lent 34,0 25,8 23,9 25,0 26,9 
Dollars lent 4,0 5,0 8,0 18,3 7,0 
The number of families in the group 268 433 176 73 950 
 
Tables 10-12 shows the dynamic of the average size of asset among the main types 
of financial assets of households. It is difficult to estimate the dynamics of deposits in 
dollars in Sberbank and commercial banks, because very few households reported about 
this type of holding. 
First of all it is obvious that there was two-three times reduction in the amount of 
money per family in all types of assets, excepting lent money. The reduction was bigger 
for the low-income households (2-4 times less). The decline in the number of asset 
holders had happened. So among the poor and the needy the number of cash holders 
reduced 1,5-2 times. That is why the statistics only for holders looks better. 
The orientation towards Sberbank has been kept in poor and needy households; there 
was a reduction of the size of the average deposit while the number of depositors 
practically had not changed. There was no reorientation from cash assets in rubles 
towards the dollar ones, rather the bulk reduction in money assets which were used to 
compensate the negative income shocks. 
The rich and independent households were more settled. The number of cash holders 
had not changed a lot. The rich families chose upon dollars in cash. The number of 
dollars' holders even grew among them. The size of average cash stock (both in rubles 
and dollars) declined, though the sums on the bank deposits had not changed. They even 
grew a bit in Sberbank. 
There was the increase in number of the families who operated with private credits 
and debts. Borrowed current assets were important financial tool in poor and needy 
families, poor families borrowed more often, but less in amount, the needy – quite the 
contrary. Loans in rubles predominated. In the independent households loans exceeded 
credits, and rubles and dollars were used equally. So we see that mutual crediting was 
widespread among the households, that was one of the possible ways of coping with the 
consequences of the crisis. 
Table 10. The sum of assets of different types per family on average  








The rich Total 
The sum of ruble assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 187,45 399,49 1098,19 2604,48 627,76 
Before the crisis in August 551,76 831,50 2144,57 3887,69 1219,57 
A year ago (in March 1998) 848,03 1077,47 2568,52 7943,08 1797,20 
The sum of dollar assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 31,32 19,48 134,64 614,93 86,84 
Before the crisis in August 24,82 86,42 203,72 1822,33 204,67 
A year ago (in March 1998) 38,88 111,33 155,72 1992,07 218,67 
Ruble deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 325,76 536,92 1006,20 2426,20 707,78 
Before the crisis in August 469,58 806,01 1263,59 2407,25 915,22 
A year ago (in March 1998) 708,60 933,14 1450,78 2072,86 1053,09 
Dollar deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 7,46 2,92 4,57 41,67 7,48 
Before the crisis in August 7,46 26,03 8,57 41,67 18,71 
A year ago (in March 1998) 7,49 ,35 5,75 41,10 6,53 
Ruble deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999) 13,06 35,56 109,20 784,72 99,95 
Before the crisis in August 48,51 66,71 192,53 929,58 149,89 
A year ago (in March 1998) 51,13 69,25 149,71 1000,00 148,45 
Dollar deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999) ,00 7,94 ,00 62,50 8,39 
Before the crisis in August ,00 6,54 ,00 181,43 16,49 
A year ago (in March 1998) ,00 5,83 2,87 157,14 14,88 
Securities of different kind, rub. 
Right now (in March 1999) 69,70 156,66 110,49 805,71 173,14 
Before the crisis in August 82,56 327,90 371,33 864,71 304,86 
A year ago (in March 1998) 109,38 456,75 433,66 1098,55 400,45 
Rubles lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 197,52 128,19 643,51 1491,32 349,49 
Before the crisis in August 89,51 96,66 579,02 507,04 216,06 
A year ago (in March 1998) 86,02 59,72 217,84 323,94 116,55 
Dollars lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 2,07 29,05 53,74 194,38 38,84 
Before the crisis in August ,00 19,95 17,24 218,06 28,97 
A year ago (in March 1998) ,00 44,96 ,57 145,83 31,70 
Household's debt at the moment of survey 
In rubles 221,69 309,95 325,87 63,89 268,89 
In dollars 10,82 14,52 50,98 32,53 21,58 
Table 11. The sums of assets of different types per household having that type of 
asset on average 
 








The rich Total 
The sum of ruble assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 2347,62 2072,37 3574,51 6980,00 3231,02 
Before the crisis in August 2993,62 2811,61 5861,83 8423,33 4223,06 
A year ago (in March 1998) 3900,95 3224,24 6935,00 16654,84 5656,66 
The sum of dollar assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 696,83 316,96 894,00 1420,69 871,23 
Before the crisis in August 655,20 1165,32 1193,21 4205,38 1951,86 
A year ago (in March 1998) 643,88 1254,73 994,23 5501,90 1981,17 
Ruble deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 2763,71 2107,17 4175,73 9066,32 3307,78 
Before the crisis in August 3685,52 2943,39 5453,39 8742,11 4082,23 
A year ago (in March 1998) 4424,44 3302,52 5984,48 8535,29 4439,77 
Dollar deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 2000,00 416,67 800,00 3000,00 1175,00 
Before the crisis in August 2000,00 3713,33 750,00 3000,00 2520,00 
A year ago (in March 1998) 2000,00 150,00 1000,00 3000,00 1537,50 
Ruble deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999) 1750,00 1906,75 3166,67 9416,67 4284,27 
Before the crisis in August 3250,00 2379,17 3350,00 9428,57 4274,24 
A year ago (in March 1998) 1957,43 2681,82 3237,50 11666,67 4346,94 
Dollar deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999)  850,00  1500,00 1128,57 
Before the crisis in August  933,33  3175,00 2214,29 
A year ago (in March 1998)  625,00 500,00 3666,67 1750,00 
Securities of different kind, rub. 
Right now (in March 1999) 1309,43 1779,83 1402,38 11280,00 2309,37 
Before the crisis in August 1545,14 4315,61 3538,59 14700,00 4157,15 
A year ago (in March 1998) 1692,18 4904,05 3927,00 18950,00 4696,19 
Rubles lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 1641,88 1015,85 4478,80 7669,64 2626,81 
Before the crisis in August 1593,33 1928,57 6716,67 6000,00 3528,95 
A year ago (in March 1998) 1514,00 1482,35 2660,71 4600,00 2120,78 
Dollars lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 275,00 1371,67 1168,75 1290,00 1214,50 
Before the crisis in August  2125,00 1000,00 2242,86 1942,86 
A year ago (in March 1998)  4800,00 100,00 2625,00 3311,11 
Household's debt at the moment of survey 
In rubles 809,79 2081,11 2075,93 1533,3 1515,55 
In dollars 362,5 617,0 882,0 339,33 579,0 
 
Table 12. The number of families in each income group having the particular type 
of asset (N, %) 
 
1999 survey 




N % N % N % N % 
The sum of ruble assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 21 8,0 80 19,3 51 30,7 25 37,3 
Before the crisis in August 47 18,4 118 29,6 60 36,6 30 46,2 
A year ago (in March 1998) 55 21,7 132 33,4 60 37,0 31 47,7 
The sum of dollar assets in cash 
Right now (in March 1999) 12 4,5 26 6,1 25 15,1 29 43,3 
Before the crisis in August 10 3,8 31 7,4 28 17,1 26 43,3 
A year ago (in March 1998) 16 6,0 37 8,9 26 15,7 21 36,2 
Ruble deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 31 11,8 106 25,5 40 24,1 19 26,8 
Before the crisis in August 33 12,7 112 27,4 38 23,2 19 27,5 
A year ago (in March 1998) 41 16,0 115 28,3 40 24,2 17 24,3 
Dollar deposits in Sberbank 
Right now (in March 1999) 1 ,4 3 ,7 1 ,6 1 1,4 
Before the crisis in August 1 ,4 3 ,7 2 1,1 1 1,4 
A year ago (in March 1998) 1 ,4 1 ,2 1 ,6 1 1,4 
Ruble deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999) 2 ,7 8 1,9 6 3,4 6 8,3 
Before the crisis in August 4 1,5 12 2,8 10 5,7 7 9,9 
A year ago (in March 1998) 7 2,6 11 2,6 8 4,6 6 8,6 
Dollar deposits in comm. banks 
Right now (in March 1999)   4 ,9   3 4,2 
Before the crisis in August   3 ,7   4 5,7 
A year ago (in March 1998)   4 ,9 1 ,6 3 4,3 
Securities of different kind, rub. 
Right now (in March 1999) 14 5,3 36 8,8 13 7,9 5 7,1 
Before the crisis in August 14 5,3 31 7,6 17 10,5 4 5,9 
A year ago (in March 1998) 17 6,5 38 9,3 18 11,0 4 5,8 
Rubles lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 32 12,0 53 12,6 25 14,4 14 19,4 
Before the crisis in August 15 5,6 21 5,0 15 8,6 6 8,5 
A year ago (in March 1998) 15 5,7 17 4,0 14 8,2 5 7,0 
Dollars lent 
Right now (in March 1999) 2 ,8 9 2,1 8 4,6 11 15,1 
Before the crisis in August   4 ,9 3 1,7 7 9,7 
A year ago (in March 1998)   4 ,9 1 ,6 4 5,6 
Household's debt at the moment of survey 
In rubles 72 27,4 63 14,9 27 15,7 3 4,2 
In dollars 8 3,0 10 2,4 10 5,8 7 9,6 
 
 
Both among the poor and the rich there was the same share (21,3 %) of families 
whose members in 1999 used Sberbank or commercial bank to transfer wages, pensions 
or benefits. Pension deposits were predominated in the group of poor households and 
current accounts – in the rich families. Time deposits and special accounts were relatively 
unusual and also well-grounded clients used them. These outcomes do not conflict with 
official statistic data, though we are not able to compare them directly.  











Current accounts 6,7 13,9 13,7 29,6 13,0 
Time deposits with monthly interest payments 1,5 4,0 5,7 10,0 4,1 
Time pension and pension deposits 13,4 18,6 14,3 8,5 15,5 
Time deposits 1,5 5,0 6,3 19,7 5,3 
Deposits for special purposes (for a child and the 
like) 
2,2 4,0 5,7 7,0 4,1 
Credit cards deposits 0,4 0,7 1,1 4,2 1,0 
Do not have any bank accounts  86,5 79,3 82,4 77,9 81,7 
 
81,7 % of families did not have any bank accounts (77,9 % among 'the rich' and 86,5 
% among 'the poor'). 
Factors of availability of the particular type of asset. For analyzing of the 
influence of a number of factors on the availability of the particular type of asset in the 
household we run the probit regression. The dependent variable - if the household had the 
particular type of asset (Appendix 4). Household per capita income was the almost only 
explanatory variable in all regression estimations. It had the positive influence on all 
forms of assets. Though it was interesting that it did not exerted influence on different 
forms of savings in terms of flow.    
The performances of a family and its main supporter were important as a 
determinant for holdings, even one kind of them (cash money or bank accounts), in a 
family. If a family was large, its main supporter was a man, and he was young and 
married, the family was more probable to have financial assets. There was a great deal of 
uncertainty about the impact of households' characteristics on the estimations of risk and 
profitability.  
Cash assets in rubles were more likely for families with a highly educated man as 
a head of it and less likely for families of the professionals. Gender was influencing on 
the amount of assets, but age and psychological variables – on savings. Cash dollars were 
more likely for families of entrepreneurs, especially in Moscow and in Ivanovo. Cash 
dollar holders did not consider the risk of bank deposits in commercial banks as a higher 
one.  The sky-high expectations of the price rise dynamic had positive impact on the 
amount of cash dollar holdings, gender and position of the main supporter of a family – 
on cash dollar savings. Wage and pension arrears during the post-crisis period had 
influenced on cash dollar holdings. 
Deposits in Sberbank were more likely for elderly men, who were at a loss while 
estimating risk and profitability of assets, though they thought that the risk of depositing 
in Sberbank was rather high. The same variables had positive impact on the size of the 
deposit, and only some of them – on the actual increase of the bank balance. Those who 
had deposits in commercial bank or dollar deposits in Sberbank were more likely to be 
employed and to be experienced with deposit losses in commercial banks. The size of this 
kind of assets was dependent on the price rise forecasts and deposit increase – wage 
arrears before the crisis. Professionals and businessmen were more likely to invest money 
into mutual funds, as well as those who considered durables and gold as risky 
investments.  
Managers and entrepreneurs were more likely to lend money in both terms 
(especially dollars). Debts in rubles were associated with households of elderly people, 
with high proportion of under age members: in dollars – those who was paid in dollars. 
When the whole sum of savings (in terms of flow) is concerned, there was a set of 
explanatory variables: household per capita income, ruble assets, experienced losses of 
deposits, and purchases of durables. It means that financial saving and accumulation of 
material wealth should not be considered as competing but rather complementary aims of 
rich households.  
As a whole it is necessary to emphasize that a set of factors that was influential a 
year ago in 1999 had appeared to become insignificant: wage arrears, the level of 
education of the main supporter of a family, income in dollars. The relationship between 
risk and profitability was not empirically found out. Non of psychological variables was 
influential.  
Consumption and dissaving after crisis. Let's consider what the assets were 
spent for during the period from March 1998 to March 1999? First of all we need to pick 
up the families whose sum of assets in March 1999 was less than a year before. There 
were not financial assets of any kind in 39,7 % of families in March 1998 (58,6% among 
the poor and 15,1% among the rich), and 8,9 % of families had not been dissaving during 
previous year (4,5 % among the poor and 11 % among the rich). The rest of all families 
had been dissaving partly or entirely. The greatest part of families had used their savings 
for buying food (79,8 % of all, 61,1 % - among the rich) and other current expenses 
(71,8% and 68,5% accordingly). It confirms the hypothesis that savings are used for 
smoothing current consumption in face of minor income shocks.  
Then, there were expenses for medical treatment - 32,9 % of families had to 
dissave for this purpose. The poor did it even more often than the rich did if we look not 
at the sums, but at the frequency of expenses of this kind. Among the poor and the needy 
there was a great proportion of elderly people and children. Savings were used for 
purchases of durables as well (23,7 %). Among the rich families 42,6 % of households 
had reported about these type of actions. Many households called for special events (25,5 
%) and education fees as the reasons for dissaving. There was also expenditures for rest 
(17,1 % of all families, 46,3 % - among the rich) and for real estate investments or 
redecorating (15,8 % and 35,2 % accordingly). And only a few 4,5 % (1 % among the 
poor, 14,8 % among the rich) had bought a car or had invested into their own business 
(3,3 % of all, 7,4 %among the rich). 
In the face of sharp reduction in household real income the major part of total 
assets was utilized for maintenance of their every day consumption pattern: if the poor 
and the needy had used them for food and primary necessities, the independent and the 
rich had transferred them partly into material assets (a car, durables) and partly into 
'human capital investments' (education, health, rest).   
What were the main forms of 'saving the assets'? First of all 36,6% of households 
(47,1% among the poor and 19,8 among the rich) there had been no problem because of 
no assets at that moment. The rest had transformed their money assets mostly into stock 
of food and articles of prime necessity. Though the period when these stocks had been 
done was not long - when prices started to rise the demand had reduced. Poor families 
(85,2 %) had used this pattern more often than the rich (58,7 %). For the rich families it 
had been more likely to buy cars, durables or real estate. Each fourth family among the 
rich (11,1 % among poor) reported about making these purchases. Dollars had been also 
popular among the rich families (32,6 % against 14,8 % among the poor). Poor families 
had used their precautionary assets for smoothing their consumption in the face of minor 
income shock in post-crisis period. More wealthy families with greater amount of assets 
had transferred the structure of their assets trying to invest money in the moving up 
assets.  
Stockpiling of food had not become an everyday practice as it had used to be in 
1991, however 46,6 % of families reported that they had been doing it occasionally after 
crisis (of necessities - 19,3 %, of durables - 5,3%). But it was even less often than in the 
1998 survey, when 58,6 % of families did it.  
Durables' and real estate purchases had also experienced the influence of two-fold 
tendencies: they were attractive as the form of asset holding, but the need to smooth the 
consumption because of income reduction had reduced in necessity to have ready assets. 
Fall in income also had reduced the possibility to make those consumer purchases. 
Comparing the data about these purchases before the crisis and after it  (from the 1999 
survey) we see that the substantial reduction of durables' purchases had taken place. 
Home appliances - from 8,7 % down to 4 % for all families (from 28,8 % down to 15,1 % 
for the rich), TV sets, video and tape recorders - from 10,4 % down to 3,5 % for all 
households (from 32,2% down to 13,7 % for the rich), winter clothes - from 18,4 % down 
to 14,0 % (had even increased for the rich), and furniture - from 3,3 % down to 2,0 % 
(from 12,3 % down to 5,5 % for the rich). As to apartments, cars, summerhouses, the 
ratio of those who had purchased them before the crisis had not been large (2,1 % - for 
cars, 1,7 % - for apartments, 0,4 % - for summerhouses) and it had not decreased as well. 
There was also the decrease in the proportion of those who had spent money for 
redecoration of their flats or houses and construction - from 10,9 % down to 6% ( from 
19,2 % down to 12,5 % - for the rich).  
7. Conclusions 
One year between two our surveys (February-March 1998, March 1999) because 
of the August crisis 1998 has proved to be turning in many respects, and first of all in the 
field of household incomes, consumption and savings. The main aims of the research 
were to shed light on the changes in household saving and portfolio behavior. 
Among the main macro consequences of the crisis in the household sector there 
were: 
• At the middle of March 1999 the exchange rate had grown since August 1998  
3,5 times. The index of consumer prices since August 1998 till March 1999 
came to 179,2 %. In the first quarter of 1999 the speed of inflation was 
slackened. The annual growth of consumer prices in 1999 appeared to be 
much less than it was forecasted in the beginning of the year. In conjunction 
with stability of exchange rate it had reduced in some valuation of ruble. 
• The withdrawing money from bank accounts, which started in June 1998 and after August 17 
had become stronger, stopped. The total bank balances grew to increase, but only in Sberbank, 
the withdrawing money from bank accounts in commercial banks continued. In March, 1999 
for the first time from the beginning of the year there was an increase in net cash dollars 
balance: households bought more cash dollars than sold.  
• The greatest damage was caused by crisis to the largest Moscow banks, but it 
had positive consequences in the banking sphere. In the early 1999 Russian 
financial markets stabilized, the lowering of the interest rates of all financial 
trading had happened. 
• The banking system became more productive oriented, that was one of the 
consequences of depreciating of the state bonds and revaluation of the 
currency credits. The lowering of the share of individual deposits stimulated 
the banking system to credit enterprises. 
• The modification of economic environment after August crisis was happening 
in the presence of the increase of the demand for domestics in the home 
market. Displacing barter with money interplant payments was the evidence of 
the improving of the financial state of industrial firms.   
• After the crisis there were positive changes in the balance of payments: if in 
the first half of 1998 the current transactions in the balance of payments of 
Russia were negative —  minus 5,6 bln. doll., one year later it became positive 
- almost 13 bln.doll. 
The impact on the household incomes (macro tendencies). 
• Some improving of economic activities during the first quarter of 1999 did not 
result in evident changes on the labour market where situation remained tight. 
At the end of March 1999 the total number of the unemployed (using the 
methodology of ILO) increased by 18,7 % during a year. 
• According to the official statistic macro data real household incomes in the 
first quarter of 1999 were came to 73 % of their level a year before. According 
to our data, it was 50% reduction. The estimation variance might be explained 
by the absence of the richest families in our sample, income understatements 
and non-representativeness of our sample for all Russia.  
• According to the data of the official statistics household expenses steadily 
exceeded 80 % of the total money incomes of households. The decreasing of 
the purchasing power of personal incomes resulted in forced rise of the 
expenses for food at the expense of nonfoods and services. These tendencies 
characterized the behavior of the majority of households, and it became 
especially evident in the low-income groups.  
Thus there were several factors of the maintaining consumption at the similar to 
pre-crisis level.  
First, permanent settlements of the wage, pension, and other arrears compensated 
the decline of real wages and incomes of the population.  
Secondly, there was a considerable decrease in saving rates. If during a half of a 
year before the crisis average saving rate according to official data was equal to 18,5%, 
eight months after August 1998, including August - only 8%. For many families it meant 
dissaving. The alternate estimation of the share of savings in household incomes (subject 
to the net increase of cash dollars on hand) in the post-crisis period was close to zero. 
According to our data, the average saving rate had become negative. It reduced from 
7,4% in March 1998 down to – 3,7%. 
Thirdly, the decreasing of purchasing power of household assets in rubles was 
partly compensated by the rising of the ruble valuation of household assets in dollars. 
However, only those households which kept their financial assets in cash dollars on the 
eve of crisis were able to use this advantage. As a result, resources were redistributed in 
favor of pre-crisis cash dollars' holders. 
Finally, the informal employment in the market and within the household sectors 
created a stream of unregistered money and in-kind incomes. 
The conclusions from the analysis of our data 1998, 1999: 
• The main trends in the dynamics of incomes and savings from our data in the 
main consist with macro estimations. 
• Econometric estimation of the consumption function resulted in a conclusion  
that after the financial crisis there was a shift on the consumption curve and a 
change in slope. 
• In the year 1998 income was practically the only determinant of consumption, 
coefficient was close to 1. The contribution of the amount of assets was not 
big, and the rest of factors (socio-demographic) had no influence on 
consumption.  
• In the year 1999 the impact of income on consumption had reduced (the 
coefficient and the slope of the curve declined). The influence of accumulated 
assets on consumption significantly increased, they substituted the reduced 
income in order to keep household consumption as invariable as possible, and 
in addition the family characteristics started to be influential.  
• According to our data, in the early year 1999 in comparison with a year before 
households started to smooth out their consumption by dissaving in the 
presence of the negative income shock. This behavior was consistent with the 
main prediction of the Permanent Income Hypothesis for the short-time period 
about the smoothing of consumption. The reduction in incomes was 
interpreted as the negative transitory income and was followed by negative 
savings. We can say that after the crisis PIH for the short-run period fits the 
data better. 
• The unification of portfolio composition had happened. As a whole it is 
necessary to emphasize that a set of factors that was influential a year ago in 
1999 had appeared to become insignificant. The per capita family income had 
remained to be the most influential factor of portfolio behavior, the impact of 
other variables was not well defined and empirically consistent. There still 
remains a good deal of uncertainty about the impact of estimations of risk and 
profitability on the portfolio behavior. Non of psychological variables was 
influential.  
As a whole, the sharply reduction of household real incomes had caused the using 
of the accumulated financial assets for current needs in order to maintain the usual level 
of consumption. The number of households who had any financial assets had reduced and 
the unification of the forms of financial savings had happened.  The change in economic 
situation had resulted in the reduction of determinants that had influenced on the portfolio 
composition in comparison with the outcomes of our survey in 1998.  
In our opinion, there were two major financial strategies that can be distinguished 
among the households with different per capita income level. Active forward-looking 
saving and consumption behavior, which had decrease in post-crisis period, was 
appropriated to the wealthy families only. This group represents not more than 10% of 
households in our sampling. The saving behavior of the medium strata of households is 
not forward-looking, they are guarded by precautionary motives mostly, and their 
smoothing of the consumption is short-termed. The incomes of the poorest families are 
hardly enough for current consumption and so they are not forward-looking and active in 
financial behavior, that is guarded by survival motives only. 
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Appendix 1. 1998 survey data 
 
Table 1 2 Number of members of the household (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo region N.Novgorod region 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample 
1 19,4 17,3 23,4 21,4 19,4 14,7 
2 26,5 28,5 28,9 29,5 27,7 27,2 
3 26,1 30,1 23 23,5 24,4 28,7 
4 19,1 17,7 17,1 19,2 19,9 18,5 
5 and more 8,9 6,4 7,6 6,4 8,6 11 
On average 2,74 2,69 2,59 2,61 2,74 2,88 
 
 
Table 2. Age (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo region N.Novgorod region 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample 
Up to active. (15 
years old) 
20,9 13,9 19,7 15,2 19,5 18,2 
Active pop. 57,3 67,7 56,3 64,4 55,8 59,8 
Older than active 24,8 21,4 24 20,3 24,7 21,9 
 
 
Table 3. Gender(%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo region N.Novgorod region 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample 
Men 45,25 44,7 44,8 44,5 45,0 45,4 
 
Table 4. A number of children in the household (%)  
 Moscow Ivanovo N.Novgorod 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample 
There are children 
up to 18 years, 
including 
42,3 37,3 39,5 40,6 39,5 43,8 
1 child 28,6 31,7 23,3 30,8 23,3 29,4 
2 children 12,2 5,6 13,9 9.0 13,9 11,7 
more than 3 
children 
1,5 0 2,3 0,8 2,3 2,7 
There are no 
children 
44,3 62,7 57,7 59,4 60,5 56,2 
 
 
Table 5. Educational level (older than 18 years) in a sample (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo N.Novgorod 
                                                           
2 Tables 1,2,4 – the data from microcensus of citizens 1994 of the State Committee of Statistics (GKS). 
Have higher education 38 36 20,9 
 
 
Appendix 1 1999 survey data 
 
Table 1 3 Number of members of the household (%) 





 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample Sample 
1 19,4 17,4 23,4 22,2 19,4 19,8 15,4 18,9 19,6 
2 26,5 24,3 28,9 29,2 27,7 28,3 24 24,8 26,7 
3 26,1 24,3 23 23,7 24,4 25,2 26,3 24,0 24,3 
4 19,1 21,2 17,1 16,0 19,9 19,0 24,3 22,0 19,6 
More than 5  8,9 12,7 7,6 9,0 8,6 7,8 10 10,3 9,9 
On average 2,74 2,97 2,59 2,62 2,74 2,67 2,93 2,81 2,77 
Number of 
families 
 259  257  258  254 1028 
 
Table 2. Age (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo region N.Novgorod 
region 
R. of Komi Total 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample Sample 
Up to active. (15 
years old) 
20,9 17,8 19,7 19,3 19,5 16,4  19,1 18,2 
Active pop. 57,3 62,5 56,3 57,3 55,8 58,9  68,7 62,7 
Older than active 24,8 19,7 24 23,4 24,7 24,7  12,2 19,9 
 












Table 3. Gender(%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo region N.Novgorod 
region 
R. of Komi Total 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample Sample 
Men 45,25 42,3 44,8 40,2 45,0 45,4 47,5 44,2 43,1 
 
Table 4. A number of children in the household (%)  
 Moscow Ivanovo N.Novgorod R. of Komi Total 
 GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample GKS Sample Sample 
There are children 
up to 18 years, 
including 
42,3 43,4 39,5 41,6 39,5 40,8 43,6 45,7 42,6 
1 child 28,6 30,9 23,3 27,6 23,3 28,3 26,9 30,7 29,4 
2 children 12,2 10,4 13,9 13,6 13,9 10,1 15 13,4 11,9 
more than 3 
children 
1,5 3,1 2,3 0,4 2,3 0,4 1,7 1,6 1,4 
There are no 
children 
57,6 55,6 57,7 58,4 60,5 61,2 56,4 54,3 57,4 
                                                           
3 Tables 1,2,4 – the data from microcensus of citizens 1994 of the State Committee of Statistics (GKS). 
  
Table 5. Educational level (older than 18 years) in a sample (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo N.Novgorod Syktyvkar 
Have higher education 44,5 32,3 23,4 40,4 
 
Table 6. The ratio of employed among of able-bodied in a sample (%) 
 Moscow Ivanovo N.Novgorod Syktyvkar 
The ratio of employed 77,7 72,5 82,5 81,1 
 
Appendix 2. The structure of household financial assets (macro statistics) 



















        
 Million rubles, in current prices 
12-97 103 300   115 200   33 000   32 695   31 418   136 857   452 469   
06-98 101 900   126 900   39 200   39 604   37 709   135 712   481 025   
12-98 131 000   126 800   22 700   50 287   60 282   478 236   869 305   
06-99 145 200   160 500   24 100   59 285   78 651   487 774   955 510   
        
 Million rubles, in December 1997 prices (CPI); 
12-97 103 300   115 200   33 000   32 695   31 418   136 857   452 469   
06-98 97 924   121 949   37 671   38 059   36 238   130 417   462 258   
12-98 71 041   68 764   12 310   27 271   32 691   259 347   471 424   
06-99 63 246   69 911   10 498   25 823   34 259   212 466   416 203   
        
 Million rubles, in December 1997 prices (consumer spending deflator) 
12-97 103 300   115 200   33 000   32 695   31 418   136 857   452 469   
06-98 95 500   118 930   36 738   37 117   35 341   127 189   450 815   
12-98 78 023   75 521   13 520   29 951   35 904   284 835   517 753   
06-99 70 239   77 640   11 658   28 678   38 046   235 955   462 217   
        
 Billion US dollars, official end-of-month exchange rate 
12-97 17,34   19,34   5,54   5,49   5,27   22,97   75,94 
06-98 16,44   20,47   6,32   6,39   6,08   21,90   77,61 
12-98 6,34   6,14   1,10   2,44   2,92   23,16   42,10 
06-99 6,00   6,63   1,00   2,45   3,25   20,15   39,47 
        
 As % of monthly income 
12-97 55,30   61,67   17,67   17,50   16,82   73,26   242,22 
06-98 81,13   101,04   31,21   31,53   30,02   108,05   382,98 
12-98 57,66   55,81   9,99   22,13   26,53   210,49   382,62 
06-99 68,07   75,25   11,30   27,79   36,87   228,68   447,97 
Source: Goskomstat, RF Central Bank, BEA estimate. 
 
Appendix 3.  
Average values of the variables. 
 1998, 1999 
surveys 
1998 survey 1999 survey 
Annual household consumption (log)  10,0706 10,4415 9,7864 
Annual household income (log)  10,0850 10,5091 9,7512 
Financial assets at the beginning of the 
period (log)  
3,6346 2,7684 4,2547 
Living space of the apartments per 
person 
15,0572 15,0350 15,0736 
If a summer house is available (yes=1) ,30 ,27 ,32 
If a garden plot is available (yes=1) ,24 ,22 ,26 
If a car is available (yes=1) ,24 ,23 ,25 
The number of members in a family  
sharing the common budget 
2,6383 2,5997 2,6667 
The number of children under 16 years ,50 ,45 ,53 
The gender of the bread-winner of a 
family (male =1) 
,59 ,61 ,58 
The age of the bread-winner /10 4,66 4,59 4,71 
The age of the bread-winner /10 squared 24,02 23,32 24,54 
If the bread-winner has high education 
(yes=1) 
,39 ,38 ,41 
The number of employed in a family 
 
1,32 1,34 1,31 
Moscow (yes=1) ,29 ,33 ,25 
N.Novgorod (yes=1) ,30 ,36 ,25 
Syktyvkar (yes=1) ,14 ,00 ,24 
Total annual household consumption, 
rub. (in 1999 prices)  
36621,86 48465,73 26878,44 
Total annual household income, rub. (in 
1999 prices)  
37553,24 52327,14 25923,74 
Total sum of financial assets at the 
beginning of the period, rub.  
4596,4801 3582,6273 5322,3065 




Appendix 4. Regression estimation  - availability of particular type of assets 
(Probit) 
 
 Dependent variable – decoded at the bottom  of the table 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Annual income per capita (log) .5270*** .3353*** .3552*** .8707*** .0070 .1880* .8377*** 
If there were incomes in dollars  (yes=1) 1.078*** .4886 .4494 -1.08  .6227* .4354 
Wage and pension arrears         
Before the crisis (yes=1) .0880 .0946 .0683 .3132 .0464 .1626 .1532 
After the crisis (yes=1) .1504 .2646 .0884 .1687 .1107 .3431 .1940 
Had been purchasing real estate during the year (yes=1) .3048* .1824 .3859** .0793 .0094 .1726 2.538*** 
Had been purchasing real durables during the year 
(yes=1) 
.3316** .3080* .3481** .2875 .0840 .1857 .0046 
If there is a summer house or a plot (yes=1) .1289 .2617* .0117 .6922** .2110 .0575 -.219 
If there is private appartments (yes=1) .0364  .244 .0206 .414 .2069 .1544 .2648 
The number of members in a family .0473  .101  .098 .0480 .0220 .056 .1303 
Gender of the bread-winner (1= male, 0=female.) .3813*** .2562 .3560** .1283 .0297 .0712 .3016 
Age of the bread-winner .0022 .0064 .0204*** .0086 .0048 .0029 .0129 
If the bread winner has the higher education (yes=1) .2714** .3083* .0281 .2942 .0459 .1782 .0361 
If the bread-winner is employed  .1587 .1581 .1922 2.100** .2687 .1097 .452 
Position of the bread-winner – manager (yes=1) .1038 .4445* .0763 .4751 .1169 .4343* .1340 
Position of the bread-winner – specialist (yes=1) -.276* .3215 .1027 .3724 .5371*** .2763* .2355 
Position of the bread-winner – entrepreneur or self-
employed (yes=1) 
.1336 .4629* .0590 1.076 .7177** .3336 .8106** 
Family status of the bread-winner (1= married) .2368 .0360 .3337** .0083 .1297 .0635 .2211 
The proportion of under-age members in a family .0332 .5894 .5486 .8950 .2999 .6142 1.411* 
The proportion of employed in a family  .0715 .0164 .3457 -.935 .1062 .6461 .6455 
Moscow (yes=1) .1394 .512** .1650 .3415 .3243 .6600*** 1.077*** 
N.Novgorod (yes=1) .446*** .472** .0709 .2963 .2142 .1809 .5259 
Syktyvkar (yes=1) .2301  .012 .3604** .4335 .7954*** .4389** .5651 
The forecast of        
Exchange rate in August 1999 .0068 .0015 .0035 .0042 -.011 -.004 .0136 
CPI in August 1999  .0080 .0407 .0145 .0706** .0090 .0131 .0327 
It is considered to be risky to invest in:        
Sberbank (yes=1) .144 .2722 .2418* .1206 .0892 .0870 .0765 
Com. bank (yes=1) .0857 -.369** .2280 .3986 .0008 .0665 .3878 
Cash (yes=1) .0703 -.001 .0301 .3978 .2628 .0984 .2264 
Durables, gold (yes=1) .1703 .2178 .0756 .6897 .5140* .1673  
Lend money  (yes=1) .0842 .1626 .1726 .1255 .0666 -.095 .0688 
Real estate (yes=1) .0126 .0430 .1084 .8156 .0168 -.519* .7490 
It is considered to be low profitable to invest in:         
Sberbank, ruble deposits (yes=1) .0539 .1473 .1020 .0022 .1543 .0971 .4601 
Sberbank, dollar deposits (yes=1) .1488 .1329 .0919 .3895 .0394 .2772* .3359 
Com. Bank, ruble deposits (yes=1) -.036 .1590 .1045 .2553 .0559 .2951 .1283 
Com. Bank, dollar deposits (yes=1) .1173 .0991 .3337 .0879 -.019 .3392 .2222 
Cash rubles (yes=1) .0593 .0670 .0537 .334 .0953 .0142 .344 
Cash dollars (yes=1) .0394 .1926 .2091 .1104 .0002 .4817** .3094 
Durables, gold (yes=1) .0996 .0812 .0889 .4035 .0137 .0505 .5559 
Lend money  (yes=1) .0639 .0551 .2739* .1881 .1148 .1464 .2548 
Real estate (yes=1) .0705 .0193 .1275 .872* .3694 -.001 .3480 
It is difficult to estimate risk and profitability .0196 .0421** .0308** .0084 -.019 .0324** .0489 
There were deposits losses in Sberbank in the year 1991 
(yes=1) 
.0716 .0427 .4628*** .1235 .2037 .0249 .0592. 
There were deposits losses in the years 1993-98  
(yes=1) 
.0937 .4007** .3722** .6462*** .4600*** .032 1026 
Had been lending money during the year (yes=1) .2642** .4409*** .2092* .5537** .063   
Had been  borrowing money during the year (yes=1) .3844*** .1435 -.230* .0846 .2427   
There is an interest to the financial information (yes=1) .1870 .1564 .4273 .722* .5334 .3319 1.43*** 
Constant 5.935*** -4.717*** 4.962*** 12.61*** 1.612 2.849** 12.40** 
Number of obs 789 789 789 789 767 790 714 
Chi2 137.94 182.51 190.29 108.37 106.77 79.79 111.66 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1614 0.2985 0.2179 0.3954 0.1884 0.1156 0.3997 
Dependent variable 
1. There are cash ruble assets (yes=1) 
2. There are cash dollar assets (yes=1) 
3. There are ruble deposits in Sberbank (yes=1) 
4. There are deposits in comm. Banks (rub, dol.) or dollar deposits in Sberbank (yes=1) 
5. There are shares in financial companies or pension funds, other securities (дyes=1) 
6. There are rubles lent  (yes=1) 
7. There are dollars lent  (yes=1) 
 
 
